The philosophy of education and the social nature of human knowledge = La filosofía de la educación y la naturaleza social del conocimiento humano by Misawa, Koichiro
Koichiro MISAWA 
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
II Época, Nº 6 (2011):127-134                                                                                                     
 
127
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Philosophy of Education             
and the Social Nature of                        
Human Knowledge 
 
La filosofía de la educación y la naturaleza         
social del conocimiento humano 
 
 
Koichiro MISAWA
1
 
 
 
Recibido: 23/11/2010 
Aprobado: 31/01/2011 
 
 
 
Resumen: 
 
Podría decirse que la filosofía de la educación está peor considerada y es menos 
apreciada que cualquier otra disciplina filosófica. Este artículo analiza críticamente el 
destacado intento por superar este impasse realizado por el filósofo inglés Wilfred Carr. Él 
anima a que la disciplina tome una nueva forma de carácter distinto al de disciplina 
académica. Sin embargo se indica, en contra de Carr, que la naturaleza social y educativa 
del conocimiento constituye la pieza central de la investigación filosófica acerca del 
conocimiento humano. 
 
Palabras clave: La relación entre filosofía y educación, Wilfred Carr, filosofía práctica, 
postfundacionalismo, segunda naturaleza, receptividad a las razones. 
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Abstract: 
 
Arguably the philosophy of education is less well regarded and appreciated than any 
other philosophical discipline. This paper critically analyses one salient attempt to 
overcome this impasse made by the English philosopher of education Wilfred Carr. He 
urges that the discipline take a new shape which is different in character from academic 
discipline. It is intimated, contra Carr, however, that the social and educational nature of 
knowledge forms the centrepiece of philosophical enquiry into human knowledge. 
 
Keywords: The relation between philosophy and education, Wilfred Carr, practical 
philosophy, postfoundationalism, second nature, responsiveness to reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is possible to identify a tension within the very phrase „philosophy of education‟, 
namely, between the activity of questioning received knowledge and the activity of 
transmitting knowledge. This sort of commonsense (and stereotypical) understanding of 
philosophy and education may be partly responsible for their meagre interaction, which is 
widely felt not just by ordinary people but also by academic philosophers, especially in the 
Anglophone analytical tradition.2 Accordingly the predicament the philosophy of education 
faces is its lacking of the appropriate impact on educational practices and its scholarly 
insularity from the rest of the philosophical disciplines. What makes general philosophers 
think they have little to say about education, however, seems not so much on account of 
philosophical reasons but rather for sociological reasons: e.g. the topology of the 
philosophy of education (it is generally conducted, unlike many other branches of 
philosophy, in Schools or Faculties of Education) and the fact that “most philosophers of 
education have the goal…of contributing not to philosophy but to educational policy and 
practice” and thus they, unlike their “pure cousins”, “publish not in philosophy journals but 
in a wide range of professionally-oriented journals”.3 One conspicuous recent tendency in 
the discourse of the gap between mainstream philosophy and the philosophy of education is 
to warn us against an “over-philosophication”4 or an “overintellectual myth”5of educational 
theory. This tendency amounts to Wilfred Carr‟s “„dephilosophised‟ or „postphilosophical‟ 
 
2
 Harvey Siegel writes: “[P]hilosophy of education has not always been regarded by contemporary 
philosophers as important, or even a legitimate, area of philosophy [with notable exceptions]”, Siegel, H., Truth, 
Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 71(2), 2005, pp. 345-366, at p. 345. David Bakhurst states: “The philosophy of 
education is perhaps the least distinguished of all the established sub-disciplines of philosophy. …The field is 
rarely considered a necessary ingredient of a serious philosophy curriculum”, Bakhurst, D., Il'enkov on Education, 
Studies in East European Thought, 57(4), 2005, Dordrecht, p. 261.    
3 Phillips, D. C., Philosophy of Education, the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), 2008:  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/education-philosophy/.  
4
 Rorty, R., The Dangers of Over-Philosophication—Reply to Arcilla and Nicholson, Educational Theory, 
40(1), 1990, p. 41. 
5
 Hirst, P. H., The Demands of Professional Practice and Preparation for Teaching, in J. Furlong and R. Smith, 
R. (eds) The Role of Higher Education in Initial Teacher Training, London, Kogan Page, 1996, p. 169. 
Koichiro MISAWA 
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
II Época, Nº 6 (2011):127-134                                                                                                     
 
129
educational strategy”,6 namely, his call to disburden the philosophy of education from being 
“an autonomous sub-area within academic philosophy”.7 I applaud Carr‟s dissatisfaction 
with the insulation of philosophy from education and agree with some of his leitmotifs, and 
yet, I cannot resist the temptation to argue that his discourse ends up being incoherent on 
closer examination. Thus, my main aim in this paper is to urge that the fear of the isolation 
of philosophy from education can be reduced in a way that is different from that of Carr‟s. 
That is, the fear can be defused not by disclaiming the philosophy of education‟s burden of 
responsibility for academic philosophy but by properly recognising the nature of human 
knowledge as essentially bound up and shot through with issues pertaining to education. 
This is not to suggest that the discipline finds a new niche in the philosophy business but 
rather to suggest that such educational dimensions should form the centrepiece of the 
philosophical enquiry into human knowledge. 
 
2. Carr’s Criticism of the Educational Theory Project 
 
What is particularly notable about Carr‟s line of thinking is a complex mix of his 
hankering after the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy and his heavy reliance on 
what he calls “postfoundationalism”.8 (The recent influence of neo-Aristotelianism on work 
in the philosophy of education is noteworthy. This is to indicate that the philosophy of 
education, in drawing on notions like practical reason and practical judgement, reflects the 
trend for philosophical work in the tradition of practical philosophy.) Carr‟s basic 
presumptions are that “what we now call „educational theory‟ is deeply rooted in the 
foundationalist discourse of late nineteenth and early twentieth century modernity”9 which 
is merely a reflection of the Enlightenment values and ideals and that we now live in a post-
modern world insofar as the fundamental conditions underlying the modern Enlightenment 
period have come to lose much of their force. Carr thus claims: “It is quite bearable to give 
up on the notion of certainty espoused in the Cartesian view of rationality, or on the idea 
that there are logical „foundations‟ to which philosophical appeal can be made, or on the 
idea that a positive science or philosophy can yield human progress…”.10 This thread of 
thought leads Carr to his highly controversial idea of “education without theory”. In Carr‟s 
view, “theory” is to be abandoned precisely because it cannot be disentangled from its own 
particularities and contingencies and thus cannot take a vantage point from which to inform 
practice as the modern project of educational theory promises. 
There has surely been disillusionment with the idea that (educational) theory can inform 
(educational) practice and furthermore there is nothing wrong with Carr‟s insistence that 
theorising is itself a form of practice.11 Nonetheless, it seems tempting to raise questions as 
to whether Carr smoothly combines an appreciation of some Aristotelian notions like 
practical reason with an employment of postfoundationalism. More specifically, the way 
Carr presents his ideas, I argue, collapses his own helpful awareness of the culturally, 
historically contingent context that has placed “educational theory” where it is, and rather 
opens him to the charge of sheer relativism.  
 
6
 Carr, W., Education and Democracy: Confronting the Postmodernist Challenge, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 29(1), 1995, p. 89. 
7
 Carr. W., Philosophy and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 38(1), 2004, p. 60. 
8
 Carr, W., Education without Theory, British Journal of Educational Studies, 54(2), 2006, p. 147. 
9
 Ibid., p. 136. 
10
 Carr, W. and Kemmis, S., Staying Critical, Educational Action Research, 13(3), 2005, p. 354, italics in 
original. 
11
 Carr, Education without Theory, op. cit., p. 147. 
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It will help here to take up the dispute between Carr and Siegel12 over Carr‟s locution. 
Siegel points out that Carr relies on the very notions that he himself purports to reject. For 
example, Carr uses the prohibited tactics, in declaring that “rationality is always relative to 
time and place”.13 If Carr is right, this assertion itself, Siegel maintains, has to be relative. 
That is: (i) if the very sentence is really relative, then the sentence does not deserve special 
attention; (ii) if the very sentence is not relative, then the sentence betrays its content, since 
the sentence is absolute. In reply, Carr responds that “[p]ostfoundationalism can... without 
contradiction, include its own thesis within its own scope”,14 for “postfoundationalism is 
not an epistemological thesis that „rejects the possibility of objective knowledge‟ but an 
explanatory thesis about how objective knowledge emerges”.15 The thesis that no discourse 
can be justified from outside any local practices of justification is unproblematic, but the 
trouble comes in if Carr is unaware (and I think he is) of the limits of the so-called 
genealogical enquiry to which he seems to commit himself in the above remark. That is, 
Carr often seems to offer his discourse not as explanatory thesis but as an “epistemological” 
thesis that there is no such thing as objective knowledge. A warning flag for espousers of 
genealogical enquiry is this: If it is impossible to reach objective knowledge due to 
historically, culturally embedded contingent factors and interests such as power or class that 
place constraints on our looking at the world, then, it follows, by the very same token, that 
it is also impossible to reach knowledge of such contingent factors and interests as such.16 
This is to indicate that, if we are to do full justice to Carr‟s discourse, his “explanatory 
thesis about how objective knowledge emerges” cannot, contrary to his project,17 offer 
another more legitimate alternative to a view or system it is criticising, even if it could 
unpack the lack of the “legitimacy” of the presently dominant view or system. In brief, 
genealogists and strong contextualists can never occupy a neutral, transcendental point of 
view precisely because, à la Carr, they are carrying out enquiry from a specific perspective 
that is already embedded in countless interests and concerns.  
What brings out certain essential features of Carr‟s thinking is his motive for avoiding 
justifying the plausibility of his discourse. For instance, in the final paragraph of his 
“Education without Theory”, he says: “Although I have argued that it [the educational 
theory project] should [be abandoned], I have carefully resisted any suggestion that this is a 
recommendation that is „justified by‟ or „follows from‟ my argument”.18 Note that this goes 
further beyond the insistence of the “post-analytical” philosophy such as Richard Rorty‟s 
view on which Carr heavily draws, one that we can discard the vocabulary of objectivity in 
 
12
 Siegel‟s view stands in stark contrast to Carr‟s in the sense that Siegel takes modernist, Enlightenment 
epistemology to be still useful and necessary and so raises suspicion of Carr‟s line of thinking.  
13
 Siegel, H., Knowledge, Truth and Education, in Carr, D. (ed.) Education, Knowledge and Truth: Beyond the 
Postmodern Impasse. 1998, London, Routledge, p. 31, italics added by Siegel.  
14
 Carr, Education without Theory, op. cit., p. 152. 
15
 Ibid., p. 151. 
16
 Frederick Schmitt duly makes this point, in a slightly different but surely relevant context. He responds to 
the pressure to abandon scientific knowledge insofar as social, political factors and interests should be taken into 
account in the consideration of scientific knowledge, claiming: “One might be tempted, after reaching skepticism, 
to give up on rationality and epistemic evaluation altogether and turn to social and political criticism of science 
instead. But I can see no way to make this approach coherent. If interests prevent us from getting straight about 
electrons, they will also prevent us from getting straight about interests” (Schmitt, F. F., Socializing Epistemology: 
An Introduction through Two Sample Issues, in F. F. Schmitt (ed.) Socializing Epistemology: The Social 
Dimensions of Knowledge, 1994, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 26, my italics). 
17
 The rational for his “education without theory” is predicated on his aspiration to “[produce] an alternative 
history of the philosophy of education to that which currently exists” (Carr, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 
55). 
18
 Carr, W., Education without Theory, op. cit., p. 156. 
Koichiro MISAWA 
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
II Época, Nº 6 (2011):127-134                                                                                                     
 
131
favour of a social practice of conversation—“the practice of justifying one‟s assertions to 
one‟s fellow-humans”.19 What underlies Carr‟s phobia of justification is his own 
understanding of the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy. 
 
3. The Interpenetration of Theory and Practice 
 
A reinvigorated awareness of Aristotelian practical philosophy, Carr asserts, involves a 
radical demand that “theoretical justification” should be replaced by “practical 
justification”, for the latter justification is “the only kind there is”.20 I have no quarrel with 
the resurrection of Aristotelian practical philosophy to the extent that it is a significant 
corrective to the excesses in the overly theoretical approach of modern philosophy to social 
practices like education. In this regard, I do not deny Carr‟s endorsed “non-theoretical 
forms of reflective philosophy”21 that never has “the aspiration to create a body of 
educational theory that can inform and guide educational practice”22 but instead which 
“enables each generation of practitioners to make progress in achieving excellence in their 
practice and, by so doing, ensure that the tradition constitutive of their practice continues to 
develop and evolve”.23 Yet, nonetheless, it does seem that Carr‟s interpretation misses the 
point of Aristotelian practical philosophy.  
Carr‟s discourse gives an inkling that he fails to acknowledge that practice as such does 
not speak by itself, as it were. Accordingly, he does not appear to have a proper 
appreciation of the other side of the same coin: namely, that theory as such is not a copy or 
representation of mind-independent objects or phenomena. In other words, a practice in 
itself by no means presents itself to us as the practice we understand and deal with—i.e. 
practice is not self-explanatory. Put the other way round, it is our history of conceptual 
commitments to practices that makes them deserve to count as a practice and thus practices 
are humanly-perceived states of affairs that make no sense to any other living beings and 
which never exist anywhere in the “natural” world. In this important sense, theory and 
practice are interconnected and go in tandem. This is the gist of what I mean by “practice as 
such does not speak by itself”. To put it in a somewhat provocative way, there exists neither 
“pure” theory nor “pure” practice. As Carr rightly claims, what theories we obtain is largely 
a matter of contingency. For what becomes the content of our knowledge never 
automatically springs to mind from what exists independently of us but (at least partly) 
depends on how we organise our enquiry into it in particular and on our mode of life in 
general. Therefore a future unified theory of all the elementary particles, for instance, might 
alter our practices such as dealing with particular objects. It is probably a fair criticism that 
Carr‟s dismissive attitude towards theory in favour of the internally self-justifying character 
of practice does not take in stride this possibility, namely that theory and practice go hand 
in hand.   
To put this in a slightly different way, what seems missing in Carr‟s picture is an 
appreciation of the most basic conditions of human knowledge that make the theory-
practice distinction possible at all and which, more generally, operate both as a promise and 
the conclusion of our intellectual activity. The fact is that behind a practice lie a wide range 
 
19
 Rorty, R., Introduction, in W. Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, R. Brandom, study guide, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 4. 
20
 Carr, Education without Theory, op. cit., pp. 155-6. 
21
 Carr, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 67. 
22
 Carr, Education without Theory, op. cit., p. 155  
23
 Carr, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 63 
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of inferences a person can make as well as other practices she ought to know as a condition 
for conducting that particular practice. This is precisely the way we live in the world as 
intellectual, sentient beings—as if we stood both within and outside our particular social 
practices at one and the same time. The major insight here is that the place we human 
beings live in is, from the very beginning, the world of such a tapestry of theory and 
practice, not the environment that non-human living beings may perceive by their 
imperative biological forces. The world I am trying to delineate here has much affinity with 
what Wilfrid Sellars calls “the logical space of reasons”24 and what John McDowell dubs 
the world of “second nature”.25 Along these lines, it is not far from the truth to say that to 
live qua humans, we need to be socialised into the world filled with meanings and 
sentience which are unique to human beings.  
A trivial but telling example of artefacts may serve to illustrate this point. This present 
world is filled with artefacts and our daily life, whatever it is, go hand in hand with those 
artefacts. This means that human beings in no ways live in a simply “natural” environment 
(which would appear if all humans and accordingly all artefacts magically disappeared). 
The decisive difference between artefacts and natural kinds is that artefacts are, from the 
outset, “embodiments of meaning and purpose”.26 It should not be taken, however, to imply 
that meanings and purposes are fixed and absolute. A part of what makes the human species 
special is the capacity to create new artefacts one after another and change the meanings 
and purposes of the existing artefacts—i.e. we can change the ways we are involved in 
those artefacts. Changes in artefacts do not cause a change in the most basic physical 
structure of the world such as natural laws27 but can be relevant to our understanding of, 
and dealings with, the world. For, first, artefacts, explicitly or implicitly, carry meaning and 
purpose; second, (new) artefacts might change how things strike us—e.g. the invention of 
X-ray made it possible for humans to observe what we could not observe before. In short, 
artefacts and how we live are deeply entangled with each other.  
The moral to be drawn from the line of thinking thus far is that the place we inhabit is 
essentially a social world. The deepest sense of “social” resides in the process through 
which humans as part of the biological species (e.g. as newborn babies) become humans as 
intellectual and sentient beings. This sense of “social” is prior to the relative difference in 
the standards of knowledge among societies to which Carr evokes sensitivity. In other 
words, human animals become a human being as a properly socialised individual. This 
educational process is precisely the point which the Cartesian brand of individualist 
epistemology falls short of recognising. To know something essentially requires being a 
member of a social world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24
 Sellars, op. cit. 
25
 McDowell, J., Mind and World, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996. 
26 Bakhurst, D. Minds, Brains and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 42(3-4), 2008, p. 427. 
Bakhurst‟s account is illustrative: “[T]o interact with the artefactual is to engage in activities that are not just 
elicited by circumstance but mediated by meaning. So the child enters the human world, the world of meaning” 
(Ibid., p. 426). It is to be noted, however, that natural kinds, if any, such as gold would be unintelligible to us 
human beings were it not for our conceptual commitments to them. 
27
 For instance, the brightest physicist would not be able to break the law of gravity. 
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4. The Social Character of Responsiveness to Reasons 
 
Insofar as the idea that theory can take a vantage point and inform practice from that 
point has now been discredited, it is a step forward, as Carr does, to raise awareness of 
particularities and contingencies that have placed a particular theory where it is. However, 
we must not miss the forest for the trees. A toxic by-product of Carr‟s discourse is that he 
seems to lose sight of the most fundamental sense of „social‟, thereby making his discourse 
look along the lines of utter relativism. The most basic sense of “social”, as mentioned 
above, underlies differences among societies, for living qua a human requires us to be a 
social being rather than simply a genetic, biological creature and this is achieved through 
initiation into what Robert Brandom calls “social practices of giving and asking for 
reasons”.28 The capacity to be responsive to reasons in unbelievably complex ways makes 
the life of the human species as a whole radically different from that of other, i.e. non-
human, living beings. Premised on this essentially social character of the ability to respond 
to reasons, we can, in varying degrees, depending on the motivation and imagination we 
have, communicate with one another, even if people live in different cultures, using 
different languages. This is in marked contrast to the case in which, for example, zoologists 
attempt to (one-sidedly rather than mutually) interpret the life of bats by appeal to 
anthropomorphism. In other words, the world of human beings as a community of thinking 
and minded beings is of an essentially social nature—“social” in a uniquely human way.  
The insight that the deepest nature of human uniqueness lies in the sociality of 
responsiveness to humanly-perceived reasons opens our eyes to the educational nature of 
human knowledge. For, the world of second nature or the game of giving and asking for 
reasons has no final word that is predestined or can be legitimated from outside of our 
world, but instead it is always in some way in process and flux. At the core of those 
processes lies education in a broad sense. This is to intimate to us that there is no need to 
follow Carr in rethinking the nature of the philosophy of education. He makes as if the 
philosophy of education is different in character from academic philosophy and it is to be 
best understood and developed as “practical philosophy”. In contrast, the perspective I have 
been urging, I hope, begins to articulate that educational aspects, broadly understood, are 
the core, if not the whole, of human knowledge. This view pursued here, if taken seriously, 
encourages us to see the traditional outlook towards the relation between philosophy and 
education differently. Paul Standish convincingly adverts to this point: “[F]orms of enquiry 
central to philosophy (into ethics, epistemology and metaphysics) themselves necessarily 
incorporate questions about learning and teaching: they ask questions not only about the 
nature of the good (for the individual and for society), but also about how we become 
virtuous; and not only about the nature of knowledge, but also about how it is acquired. In 
other words, these essentially educational questions of teaching and learning are not 
external matters to which the philosophy is applied, but internal to philosophy itself”29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
 Brandom, R, B., Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge, 
Harvard university press, 1994, p. xiv. 
29
 Standish, P., Rival Conceptions of the Philosophy of Education, Ethics and Education, 2(2), 2007, London-
New York, Taylor & Francispp, p. 162, italics in original. Standish is not alone in making this point. See, for 
example, Bakhurst‟s "Il'enkov on Education", op. cit. 
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The way out of the neglect of the philosophy of education begins with the realisation 
that the real task of philosophical enquiry into knowledge is to cast light on its “social” 
character in the sense I have been delineating and on its inevitable implications for the 
educational dimensions inherent in it. As Carr rightly sees things, there is no occupying a 
neutral ground in the world we live in. This reminds us that our world is not a simply 
“natural” environment that can exhaustively be explained in natural-scientific terms but 
rather a social world that imposes a requirement for there to be reasons unique to human 
beings. We cannot wipe away these reasons that are embodied and repositted in various 
forms as the legacy of human history but this by no means implies that such reasons and the 
ways we respond to them are absolute or fixed. It is instead brought to the forefront of our 
minds that at the heart of the world we live in, there lie ongoing processes. The full 
recognition of this point will bring a new tone to the philosophical study of education in 
particular and of human knowledge and development more generally30. 
 
 
 
 
30
 I am grateful to Bianca Thoilliez for her generous help. 
